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Introduction
The Schengen Agreement, first enforced in 1995 by a group of countries, has abolished identity checks at internal EU borders. Today, the agreement covers 26 countries, 4.2 million km 2 , and about 400 million citizens. By eliminating waiting times at borders, Schengen facilitates the free movement of people and goods, thereby complementing the EU single market. In the current refugee crisis, Aussilloux and Le Hir (2016) and Boehmer et al. (2016) warn about high economic costs of suspending Schengen. They assume that identity checks at borders are equivalent to introducing an ad valorem tariff of 3%.
The few existing econometric studies of the Schengen agreement, such as Davis and Gift (2014) or Chen and Novy (2011) , ignore that Schengen membership treats different country pairs differently, depending on the number of internal borders to be crossed. Moreover, existing studies do not always live up to state-of-the-art gravity modeling. E.g., they exclude services and domestic trade flows or fail to minimize omitted variable bias. We deal with these problems by (i) using a more accurate definition of treatment, (ii) employing the most recent and most adequate data, and (iii) making full use of newest methodological advances.
Empirical Model
We start with the general structural gravity equation X Head and Mayer (2015) . is the trade elasticity.
We assume that φ s ij,t is an exponential function of our Schengen measure and of indicator variables measuring whether i and j are both members of the EU, the Eurozone, or any other regional trade agreement (RTA). This implies the following empirical gravity model We are interested in unbiased estimates of the treatment effects β s . Contrary to the literature, we do not define Schengen ij,t as a binary variable taking value 1 if country i and country j have both ratified the Schengen agreement. Such a definition mismeasures the treatment. A land-borne trade flow in Europe from i to j may cross up to 8 internal Schengen borders.
1 Moreover, the pair ij may benefit from lower transit costs, even if i and/or j are outsiders to Schengen. Therefore, we use a count variable Schengen ij,t = {1, . . . , 8} registering the number of Schengen border crossings that land-borne trade between i and j involves.
Selection into Schengen may not be random. The estimate of β s would be upward biased if trade shocks ε s ij,t > 0 increase the odds of i and j being affected by Schengen. However, joining Schengen is not a bilateral decision, and transportation costs between countries i and j depend on the Schengen status of transit countries. Thus, reverse causation may not be a major issue. Nonetheless, we introduce country-pair fixed effects to account for all timeinvariant determinants that might jointly affect Schengen ij,t and X s ij,t . This also addresses omitted variable bias and the endogeneity of other policy variables.
We follow Baier and Bergstrand (2009) in dealing with unobserved multilateral resistance terms.
2 Finally, we include domestic trade (i = j). Dai et al. (2014) show that this is important conceptually and quantitatively for the ex post evaluation of trade policy.
We estimate (1) by Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) methods as recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . on the time variance within country pairs with different exposure to Schengen borders relative to the total number of borders crossed (captured by the bilateral fixed effect ν s ij ).
Data
We use yearly bilateral data on goods and services trade flows between and within countries, and sectoral output and expenditure data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) for 40 countries and the years 1995 to 2011. Geographical and historical variables stem from CEPII. Information on RTAs comes from the WTO.
4
Data on the successive accession of countries to the Schengen Agreement stem from the European Commission.
5 We combine GIS data with information from Google Maps to count the number of Schengen borders to be crossed by truck (and ferry) moving from economic centers of i to j in year t. In 2011, a share of 35% of goods trade of EU countries crosses 1 Schengen border. The share is 17%, 7%, and 3% for 2, 3 or more than 3 borders, respectively. For services trade the shares are 21%, 13%, 7%, and 3%, respectively. The residual originates from outside the EU-27. Air-borne trade is unlikely to benefit from the Schengen agreement; sea-borne trade, however, may well benefit, as goods are shipped from major seaports to consumers (see robustness checks). Table 1 provides results for total, goods, and services trade. Even-numbered columns show that the effect of a single Schengen border between a country pair leads to an increase in goods trade of about 3.8% and of services trade of 3.5%.
Benchmark results
6 Assuming a trade elasticity = 5, estimates imply ad valorem tariff equivalents (AVTEs) of 0.74% in goods trade, and of 0.68% in services trade.
7
Failing to account for regional integration, as in the odd-numbered columns, leads to omitted variable bias and drastically inflates the Schengen effect.
Country pairs differ in the number of internal Schengen borders crossed by bilateral land-borne trade. When two internal borders are involved, the AVTE for goods amounts to 1.5%; 8 with three border crossings we get 2.2%, and so forth; analogously for services trade. Accounting for the different trade structures of all EU-27 country pairs, the total average trade creating effect of Schengen is 3.29%, i.e., an AVTE of 0.67% (applying = 5). Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the country-pair level. Pair and time fixed effects as well as separate multilateral resistance terms for all trade costs proxies (distance, contiguity, and all trade policy indicators) included but not reported. Number of observations: 27,200.
Depending on their geographical location, Schengen affects countries differently. Calculating average AVTEs by EU member states, 10 we find that peripheral countries such as Finland, Estonia, and Latvia display the highest AVTEs (1.19%, 1.13%, and 1.07%, respectively (see Web Appendix, Table A.14). These countries typically trade across several internal EU borders. At the lower end, central economies such as Germany or France display smaller AVTEs (0.54% and 0.51%, respectively). Ireland features the lowest AVTE, 0.23%, as it trades a lot with non-Schengen countries. Non-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey also benefit. The respective AVTEs are 0.45% and 0.72%.
Robustness Analysis
Each cell in Table 2 reports the Schengen effect obtained from alternative regressions. First, we vary the sample (panel A). In the benchmark model, we have excluded products transported by pipeline or ship (gas, petrol, mining & quarrying products). Considering them, the effect of a Schengen border on bilateral goods exports amounts to an AVTE of 0.80%; see line [1] .
11
In line [2], we exclude the three most important trade partners of each country from the sample, as they could have driven the decision to join Schengen. This is supposed to reduce endogeneity concerns. The results support our previous findings. Line [3] focuses on intracontinental European trade only (treating Turkey and Russia as Europe). Results remain very similar to our benchmark results. The effect on services trade is now more accurately measured. 10 We average across goods and services, and trade partners. 11 Assuming = 5. Panel B looks at alternative measurements of treatment. In line [4], we assume that inter continental trade with Schengen members crosses one internal Schengen border on average (e.g., as goods move from seaports to the interior of the continent). This increases estimates, leading to AVTEs of 0.48% for total trade, 1.02% for goods, and 1.4% for services. Line [5] (wrongly) employs a binary Schengen indicator as in Davis and Gift (2014) , or Aussilloux and Le Hir (2016) . This more than doubles the Schengen effect. Similarly, coding whether both, one or none of the trade partners are Schengen members (Schengen = 0, 0.5, 1), as in Chen and Novy (2011) , strongly inflates the estimates (line [6] ).
Panel C varies econometric choices. Line [7] uses importer and exporter GDP instead of sectoral supply and expenditure. This slightly increases the effects, suggesting AVTEs of 1% for goods and 0.72% for services trade. If we pool over all 35 sub-sectors instead of aggregating trade, we find a statistically significant effect on total and goods trade, but the effect on services vanishes (line [8] ). Replacing bilateral fixed effects by explicit trade cost proxies, such as bilateral distance, adjacency and common language, leads to implausible effects not only on Schengen membership, but also on the other trade policy variables (see Web Appendix, Table A.13), a result reminiscent of Baier and Bergstrand (2007) .
A. Web Appendix to Felbermayr et al. (2016) , "The Trade Effects of Border Controls: Evidence from the European Schengen Agreement". Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Robust clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Pair and time fixed effects included but not reported. All specifications include multilateral resistance terms for all trade costs. Number of observations: 14,297. Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Robust clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Pair and time fixed effects included but not reported. All specifications include multilateral resistance terms for all trade costs. Number of observations: 27,200. 
